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Introduction 
Many countries around the world mandate affirmative action in higher education, where groups that have 
historically faced discrimination are given preferential admissions.  In the context we study—state controlled 
colleges in India—more than 50 percent of admissions slots are reserved for the members of lower-caste groups.  In 
this paper, we empirically examine the impact of affirmative action in education to understand its effectiveness in 
redistributing both opportunity and income to marginalized groups. 
We are motivated by the vigorous debate surrounding affirmative action programs.
2  The debate is focused 
on two main issues.  The first issue centers on the question of who these programs actually target.  Many claim that 
affirmative action only benefits a small sliver of the population: those of the traditionally disadvantaged group that 
actually come from economically advantageous backgrounds.
3  Specifically, if the marginal admit of the 
“disadvantaged” group comes from a richer household than the marginal admit of the “advantaged” group, 
affirmative action programs may actually be regressive in nature.  Put another way, such programs may take slots 
from less advantaged members of an advantaged group and give them to individuals who are more advantaged, but 
just happen to belong to a less advantaged group.  The second issue is whether and how much these programs 
actually help those who gain admissions—the so-called “mismatch” hypothesis.
4  One side argues that because 
these programs place minorities in an academic environment for which they are unprepared, those who gain 
admissions due to affirmative action will do poorly in classes, be more likely to drop out, and flounder in the job 
market.  In the worst-case scenario, they could actually be worse off, either through lost time spent in college or 
through a discouragement effect.  However, others argue that such programs may result in net gains for the 
disadvantaged groups—that is, that the targeted groups may not only benefit from the education they receive, they 
may actually benefit more than the traditionally advantaged groups.  Thus, affirmative action would be consistent 
with an efficient reallocation of educational slots.  
 
2 Holzer and Neumark (2000) provide an overview of the efficiency aspects of affirmative action. Fryer, Loury, and Yuret 
(2003) also provide a theoretical analysis, which discusses the efficiency costs.  
3 In the US context, Bowen and Bok (1998) have examined affirmative action in higher education using detailed micro-
admissions data similar to our own though without an explicit regression design such as ours to examine outcomes.     
Arcidiacono (2005) has used a structural model to estimate the impact of affirmative action policies in higher education. 
4 The mismatch hypothesis has been discussed by Thernstrom and Thernstrom (1997), Herrnstein and Murray (1994), and 
D’Souza (1981). Loury and Garman (1993), Kane (1998), Alon and Tienda (2005), and Rothstein and Yoon (2007) empirically 
examine the mismatch hypothesis in the US context.    2
Despite the importance of this debate, data restrictions have hampered a thorough empirical investigation. 
Existing studies of affirmative action are limited to studies of the outcomes of those who were admitted and 
matriculated.  The lack of follow up data on those who do not gain admissions makes it hard to test several of the 
above hypotheses, such as the costs to those who “lost out.”  As Fryer and Loury (2005) discuss, there are strong 
beliefs that affirmative action programs greatly harm non-minority groups and this belief dampens support for such 
programs.  However, these beliefs are hard to evaluate, since there is very little real evidence to date on the 
magnitude (if any) of the harm.  The lack of data on those who did not matriculate is particularly problematic. An 
individual may choose not to matriculate because he or she had better outside options, biasing the estimated 
impacts of affirmative action.  For example, Rothstein and Yoon (2007), arguably the most informative paper on 
affirmative action in higher education to date, compares the outcomes of matriculants at higher quality US law 
schools versus lower quality law schools to assess the impacts of affirmative action policies.  However, suppose 
that matriculation rates are lower for those who did not obtain admissions to higher quality law schools because 
only those who did not have better outside options attend the low quality schools.  In this case, the analysis would 
overestimate the impacts of affirmative action.  In contrast, this study assembles the most comprehensive dataset 
available on affirmative action in higher education (to our knowledge) by collecting detailed follow-up data on a 
pool of initial applicants, whether they were admitted and whether they matriculated.   
We do so in the Indian context.  In traditional Hindu society, individuals are born into a caste group that 
determines one’s rights and responsibilities related to occupation, social standing, and permissible forms of social 
interactions with members of other caste groups.  Since caste is hereditary and also tends to be occupation-specific, 
occupation was traditionally determined by birth (Osborne 2001).   Recent work by Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2005), for example, shows how caste-based labor markets have trapped individuals in narrow occupational 
categories for generations, and persist even today.  In an attempt to reduce these caste-based inequalities, state 
universities in India reserve seats for individuals from each of the traditionally disadvantaged groups—the 
Scheduled Tribes (ST), the Scheduled Caste (SC), and the Other Backward Castes (OBC). 
The system of admissions and reserved seats is quite straightforward.  To apply to a university, each 
applicant sits for a standardized exam.  Admission is a deterministic function of one’s exam score and caste group.  
Within each caste group, only those who have scored above a given threshold for their caste group are admitted.    3
                                                
Due to the structure of this process, we can isolate the marginal admits across castes to examine the impact of 
attending a college for each caste group.  Specifically, we compare various outcomes for applicants above and 
below the admission threshold in each caste group.  This allows us to investigate whether the “lower” caste groups, 
who are favored in admissions by the affirmative action policy, are actually helped by it.  Moreover, we can 
describe which candidate (e.g. richer or poorer background) is being substituted for through the affirmative action 
policy.
5   
We focus on individuals applying for entrance to engineering colleges in 1996 in one Indian state.  We 
chose to study engineering colleges because they are among the most prestigious types of colleges in India.  To 
implement our research design, we collected two data sets.  First, we collected a census of all individuals who took 
the admissions exam in 1996.   The minimum score for admission is roughly 480 out of 900 for upper-caste 
individuals, 419 for the OBC category, and 182 for the SC category.
6  These score disparities at entrance confirm 
the plausibility of the hypothesis that lower-caste students will simply not be able to perform in college and, hence, 
will not benefit from admission because of the mismatch between their basic skill level and the skill requirements 
of an engineering education. To better understand outcomes across caste groups, we interviewed about 700 
households from this census of applicants between 2004 and 2006 (approximately 8-10 years after the entrance 
exam).  We surveyed both the applicant and their parents to gauge life outcomes including income and occupation, 
job satisfaction, social networks, and caste identity.  
Our first finding is that, contrary to the arguments of some critics, caste-based targeting does result in the 
targeting of individuals who are more economically disadvantaged.  For example, under a reasonable set of 
assumptions, the parental income among upper-caste students displaced by the affirmative action policy is Rs 
14,088, compared to Rs 8,340 among the displacing lower-caste students. Similarly, 41 percent of displaced 
students come from a household in which the head holds at least a master’s degree, compared to only 14 percent of 
displacing students.  Fifty-nine percent of displaced students attended an English private school, compared to only 
35 percent of displacing students.  The one piece of countervailing evidence is that displaced students are 
disproportionately female.  Specifically, 73 percent of those “displaced” by the reservation policy are males, 
 
5 This design inherently means we will not be estimating the impact of removing the entire affirmative action policy. Instead, 
we estimate how marginal winners and losers fare in the current context. This estimation is useful given that participants in the 
broader policy debate make different assumptions about how winners and losers fare. 
6 Applicants from the ST category were dropped from the analysis.  Due to the large number of available seats and few 
candidates from this group, a large fraction of applicants from this category obtained admissions.     4
                                                
compared to 84 percent of the “displacers.”  As a whole, however, our evidence suggests that targeting by social 
group also serves (at the margin) to target the socio-economically disadvantaged.  
We next examine labor-market outcomes. We find that, despite much lower basic skills (as measured by 
the score on the entry exam), those who are admitted by affirmative action economically benefit from attending 
engineering college.  Depending on the specifications, attending engineering school increases lower-caste 
members’ monthly income by between Rs 3,700 and Rs 6,200.  This corresponds to an increase of 40 to 70 percent.  
This is (statistically and economically) indistinguishable from the rate of return enjoyed by upper-caste groups.  In 
other words, we find no support for the mismatch hypothesis.  
However, our estimates suggest that these programs come at an absolute cost.  Specifically, attending 
engineering college increases the monthly income of the (displaced) upper-caste members by about Rs 5000 more 
than it increases the monthly income of the (displacing) lower-caste members (significant at the 15 percent level).  
Furthermore, our results for broad caste groups mask some underlying heterogeneity in which subgroups benefit.  
Specifically, in the lower-caste group, it is those from higher socio-economic backgrounds that appear to derive 
positive returns.
7 This suggests that while lower-caste members do benefit from the policy, it is the economically 
better-off among them who benefit the most.   
While access to higher education may improve earning potential, it could also increase access to more 
satisfying careers.  Thus, we studied whether affirmative action affected job quality and satisfaction. While 
attending engineering college qualitatively improves job quality (as measured by variables such as likelihood of 
using a computer or speaking English at work) and job satisfaction among the lower-caste group members, it does 
not yield the same job quality “returns” to lower-caste group members as to upper-caste group members.  
Finally, we also examine the impact of affirmative action on individuals’ attitudes towards other castes and 
towards affirmative action programs in general.  How are upper-caste applicants’ attitudes affected by being denied 
a seat in engineering college due to reservations?  How are lower-caste applicants’ attitudes affected by being 
offered a seat in engineering college due to reservations?  We find no evidence that upper-caste group members 
who “lose out” due to the policy end up with more negative attitudes towards lower castes or towards affirmative 
 
7 Due to the nature of our research sample, this statement is for a population with roughly similar scores for both groups.   5
                                                
action programs in general. However, we find some weak evidence that the lower-caste group members who 
directly benefit from the reservation policy end up being stronger supporters of the programs.   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section I discusses the history of affirmative action policies in 
India.  Section II describes the data and methodologies.  Our findings are presented in Section III.  Section IV 
concludes with a discussion of our main findings and suggestions for future work.  
 
I.  History of Affirmative Action Policies in India 
The roots of India’s current affirmative action policies date back to the colonial-era reservation programs for 
government jobs, political representation, and scholarships established under British rule (Kumar, 1992).
8 With 
independence from Britain in 1947, Jawaharal Nehru and the Congress Party chose to maintain the British system 
of reserving seats in the legislature (Osborne, 2001).  Article 46 of India’s Constitution contained a directive to 
provide special considerations to members of the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST).
9  While the 
Constitution originally banned any kind of discrimination in college admissions, it was amended in 1951 to allow 
the government discretion in whether to provide any special consideration for the advancement of the SC and ST.  
This paved the way for both the central government and the individual states to adopt reservations in college 
admissions (Weisskopt, 2003).    
While the constitution prohibited discrimination against the “other backward categories” (OBC)—a group 
that was more advantaged than the SC and ST, but less advantaged than the upper-caste groups—it did not institute 
any affirmative action policies for them.  In 1953, the central government formed a commission to study the 
situation of the OBC. The commission recommended that an additional 2,399 “backward” castes—roughly 40 
percent of the population—should also be eligible for reservations (de Zwart, 2000b).  This recommendation was 
not acted upon, however.  Instead, the central government left the power to grant concessions to other backward 
caste groups to individual states.  By the mid-1970s, states such as Tamil Nadu and Karnataka had instituted high 
 
8 The first recorded affirmative action policies in India were quota systems for administrative positions in the more progressive 
state governments, such as Mysore in South India, and Baroda and Kolhapur in Western India (Das, 2000).  Political 
reservations soon followed:  the first caste-based lists of reserved, parliamentary seats were published under British rule in 
1936 (Osborne, 2001). 
9 “The state shall promote with special care the education and economic interests of the weaker sections of people, and, in 
particular, of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.  
Who is a member of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes has been defined under article 366 of the Constitution.”     6
                                                
quotas for the OBC (Baley, 1999).  However, there were no reservations for the OBC in centrally-controlled 
institutes, such as the prestigious IITs and IIMs.   
In 1978, the central government once again formed an exploratory commission—known as the Mandal 
Commission—to explore again the situation of the OBC.  It identified 3,747 castes, or 52 percent of the population, 
as backward (de Zwart, 2000b; Wolpert, 2006).  It recommended reservations for all public-sector jobs and all 
private-sector endeavors that receive financial assistance from the government. It also recommended that reserved 
seats be held in university admissions for the OBC (Kumar, 1992; Weisskopt, 2003).  The Commission would have 
preferred to recommend that the OBC groups receive a 52 percent quota, in addition to the 22.5 percent already set 
aside for SC and ST.
10  However, the Supreme Court had already ruled that central-government reservations could 
not exceed 50 percent.  As such, the Commission recommended a 27 percent reservation for the OBC (Wolpert, 
2006).  The report was shelved until 1990, when the central government reported that it would enforce only some of 
the recommendations of the Commission for public-sector jobs.  This announcement led to widespread rioting and 
protest (Osborne, 2001).  In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld the Mandal reservations of 27 percent for public-
sector jobs for the OBC.  It also ruled that the central government and all state governments must exclude the 
“creamy layer,” i.e. richer members, of the OBC from the reservations in public sector jobs (Osborne 2001, 
Wolpert, 2006).  
The original reservations specified in India’s Constitution were set to expire in 1960.  They have since been 
extended several times over, and are now set to expire in 2010.  In all colleges controlled by the central 
government, 7.5 percent of seats have been reserved for the ST and 15 percent of seats have been reserved for the 
SC, for a total of 22.5 percent of reserved seats.  There are no reservations for the OBC in these centrally-controlled 
colleges.  In colleges controlled by state governments, the percentage of seats reserved for ST/SC depend on the 
approximate proportions of these groups in each state.  After the Mandal Commission, many states also 
implemented the 27 percent reservations for OBCs to varying degrees in state-controlled colleges.   
Starting in 2005, reservations in education were once again at the forefront of Indian politics.  In August 
2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the State could not impose quotas in privately-funded colleges.  The ruling led 
 
10 Limited data on the composition of caste existed, much less on the composition of caste by occupation, as the 1931 Census 
was the last census to have collected caste information.  Thus, the population figures that are the basis of the reservations 
policy are much disputed, even today (Pande, 2003).   7
                                                
to the passage of the 93
rd Constitution Amendment Act, which gave the State the power to institute affirmative 
action policies in all "educational institutions."
11  In May 2006, the government announced a plan to extend the 27 
percent reservation for the OBC to all central universities, resulting in massive protests.  Parliament passed the bill 
in the winter session of 2006-2007.  However, in March 2007, the Supreme Court gave a stay order on the bill, 
citing the lack of data on which groups are indeed economically and socially disadvantaged.  Thus, as in many other 
countries, affirmative action continues to dominate the policy debate in India. 
 
II. Data and Methodology 
This section details the admission process for an engineering degree in the state where our research occurs.  It also 
discusses the sample construction and survey design.  We conclude with a discussion of attrition. 
 
Admission Process for an Engineering Degree 
During the start of his or her final year of high school, an individual must sit for a general college admissions 
examination (called the “10+2 examination”).  The score on this exam and caste category fully determine 
admissions to most colleges.  To gain admission into very prestigious programs or universities—such as medical 
and engineering colleges—in a particular state, each individual must first pass the 10+2 exam.  Individuals who 
have passed this exam can then take a second-round statewide entrance exam. 
  In this paper, we use data from the second-round entrance exam to engineering colleges in one Indian state.  
The exam consisted of three sections—math, physics and chemistry—each with 100 multiple choice questions 
worth 3 points each, for a total of 900 points.  After taking the exam, individuals were ranked based on their total 
score for each caste category (General, OBC, SC, and ST).
12  Starting from the highest ranking in each caste 
category, an individual was invited for a counseling session where he/she was informed about possibilities for 
admissions to the different engineering colleges.  The individual then chose whether he/she would like to attend, 
 
11 “Educational institutions” has been left undefined.  Thus, many claim that this amendment now allows the government, if it 
chooses, to implement reservations in all levels of schooling, and not just university education. 
12 For individuals with the same score, individuals are ranked first by math score, then by chemistry score, and finally by 
physics score.  In the circumstance that individuals have the same three scores, the birthday determines the time—the older 
individual obtains the higher rank.  As such, each individual has a unique ranking.   8
                                                
and if so, which college and type of engineering course he/she wanted to pursue.
13  The process continued down the 
rankings until all seats in the colleges were full. 
   Since states can increase the reserved seats for each caste group, the actual percentage of reserved seats 
varies from state to state.  In the state-year we study, a total of 2,643 seats were available, with 2,054 seats open to 
the reservations policy; the remainder were payment seats not covered by the policy.
14  The quotas were determined 
by the distribution of castes in the state: there was a 16 percent reservation for the Scheduled Castes, a 21 percent 
reservation for the Scheduled Tribes, and a 14 percent reservation for the Other Backward Castes, for a total of 51 
percent of seats reserved.  Across each category, there were additional reservations for those who entered from a 
technical stream, were the child or grandchild of a “Freedom Fighter,” or were military personnel (saniks).     
As we indicated above, we obtained data from the 1996 entrance exam.  For all individuals, the data 
included:  individual’s name, father’s name, address in 1996, scores on each portion of the exam, rank, birth date, 
caste group, and an indicator for whether the individual qualified for any other reserved category.  We also obtained 
a list of all applicants who actually attended engineering colleges in the state in 1996.   
 
Sample Determination  
When determining the research sample, we dropped two types of individuals.  First, we excluded individuals who 
qualified for the special reserved categories (handicap, freedom fighter, etc.).  Second, we excluded the ST category 
from the analysis as most of the ST applicants gained admission to the engineering colleges.  For example, if we 
look at the bottom third of the test-score distribution for ST, 17 percent actually enrolled, which implies that many 
more were actually admitted; in comparison, there is a 0 percent enrollment rate in the bottom third of the test-score 
distributions for all the other caste groups.
15   
 
13 Individuals with a higher ranking, therefore, get a choice about which institute to attend and which subject within 
engineering (major) to study.  Since the reservation percentages cut across each institution and each branch, it is impossible to 
place all members from the reserved categories in only the worst colleges or branch. 
14 In many states, there is an oversupply of colleges. Therefore, the reservations are not always binding—individuals are not 
closed out of engineering colleges due to the quota systems.  This was not the case in the state discussed in this paper in 1996.  
Thirty thousand nine hundred fifty-nine applicants sat for the exam to gain admission for 2643 seats across 14 engineering 
colleges.  Due to the high demand for engineering degrees, this state saw a boom in engineering colleges, particularly unaided, 
private colleges.  By 1998, the number of available seats rose to 4997. 
15 Unlike the other groups where about 5 to 8 percent of total applicants actually attended engineering universities, 28 percent 
of ST applicants went to an engineering college.     9
                                                
Figure 1 presents test score distributions by caste category.  As we already indicated above, lower-caste 
applicants, and especially SC applicants, scored lower on average on the entrance exam. The upper-caste group 
(general category) and OBC group also had a larger range of test scores than the SC group.   
We planned to survey applicants who were both above and below the admission cutoff in each caste 
category.  However, in this particular context, the “true” cutoff scores for admission are unknown.
16  Thus, using 
the data on enrollments, we chose cutoffs of 182 for the SC, 419 for the OBC, and 490 for the upper-caste groups.  
These cutoff choices were validated using the method described in Chay, McEwan and Urquiola (2005), in which 
the selected cutoff maximizes the goodness of fit from a model of attending engineering college as a function of an 
indicator equal to one if one’s score is below a particular threshold.  Figure 2 graphs, for each caste category, the 
percentage of individuals who actually enrolled as a function of their test score.
17  The vertical line on each graph 
indicates the aforementioned cutoff score for that caste category. 
We selected a sample of applicants above and below their caste category cutoff.  For the first round of 
surveys, we restricted ourselves to individuals who lived in one of the four more populous cities in terms of number 
of applicants.  Conditioning on an address in one of these four cities, we then chose for the SC sample the 190 
applicants right above the cutoff and 190 applicants right below the cutoff.  This sample represented a higher 
percentage of total number of SC applicants than the 190 applicants right above and right below the cutoff for the 
other groups.  We therefore calculated what percentage of the full list of SC applications our sample comprised, and 
determined ranges of test scores that corresponded to the same percentage for the other two caste groups.  The OBC 
and upper-caste samples were then constructed by randomly choosing individuals above and below the cutoff 
within these test score ranges.  Thus, we made a choice to not obtain more individuals closer to the cutoff for the 
upper-caste and other backward castes in order to obtain more comparable samples across caste categories.
18  In 
total, we searched for 1,292 households across the three caste categories in the first wave of surveying that took 
place between October 2004 and May 2005.  Between May and July 2006, a second wave of surveys was 
 
16 Note that because individuals who are higher ranked can choose which school (and major) they will attend, there could, in 
theory, be more than one discontinuity (e.g. there could be a discontinuity in admissions for each school and major).   
Unfortunately, we do not have a large enough sample size to evaluate the impact of admissions to each individual engineering 
school.   
17 To create Figure 2, the test score distribution for each caste group was broken into 50 bins of equal size, and the percentage 
of individuals who enrolled in each bin was graphed. 
18 We had briefly considered a second potential cutoff for the upper-caste group (590).  Since we had two potential cutoffs for 
the upper-caste group, we chose a sample large enough to analyze the data for both cutoffs. The cutoff we ultimately selected 
for upper caste is the one that better predicted entry into engineering school in the first-stage regression.    10
                                                
conducted in the next four more populous cities in terms of number of applicants. The research samples were 
constructed using the same methodology as for the four more populous cities.  In this second wave of surveying, we 
searched for an additional 692 households.  Therefore, in total, we searched for 1,984 households. 
 
Survey Design and Outcomes 
The survey consisted of two parts.  The first part was directed at the parents of the applicant, while the second part 
was directed at the applicants themselves.  Many questions, particularly parental background and child employment 
outcomes, were similar on both the parent and applicant surveys, so that if the applicant could not be interviewed, 
we could still collect their basic outcomes data from surveying their parents.  When both the parent and the 
applicant could be located, we continued to ask each of them both sets of questions to be able to assess the accuracy 
of the parent’s responses on applicant’s educational and employment history.     
In the survey, we collected data to inform the policy debate regarding affirmative action.  First, we 
collected data on the background of parents to allow us to determine the social standing of those aided by the 
reservations.  Second, we documented the educational and employment histories of the applicants to determine the 
economic consequences of attending an engineering college.  Finally, we gathered information to understand 
whether educational opportunities also affected non-economic outcomes, such as the identity of one’s friends or 
one’s perceptions and preferences.   
Considerable effort was spent to locate as many households as possible.  The enumerators first visited the 
parents’ recorded address as of 1996 to determine if the parents still lived there.  If the parents had moved, the 
enumerators went door to door and asked the neighbors for contact information.
19  The survey was primarily 
conducted in person, but if the applicant or parents had moved out of the city, the survey was conducted by phone.  
Overall, 663 parents and 407 applicants were both found and agreed to participate in the survey, for a total of 721 
households.
20  The individuals in the upper caste category who were located and agreed to participate span the 56
th 
to 100





th percentile for the OBC and SC, respectively.   
 
19 The survey team also looked up the contact information of individuals in the phone book, but this only captured moves 
within the city. 
20 An additional 172 families were located, but refused to be part of the survey.  In most cases, when the individual could not 
be located, the family had moved and the neighbors did not have contact address.  In a few cases, the address did not exist, the 
family never lived at the address, or the individual in question passed away.   11
                                                
Appendix Table 1 compares located households with households that could not be located, by cutoff status 
and caste category.  First, as Panel A shows, our ability to locate a given household was about the same regardless 
of whether or not that household was above or below the score cutoff; this is true for all three caste groups. In the 
remaining panels of Appendix Table 1, we compare basic characteristics (as available in the entrance exam data) 
between located and non-located households.  Column 1 presents the difference (between located and non-located 
households) in the characteristic of interest for those above the threshold, while column 2 presents the same 
difference for those below the threshold.  Column 3 presents the differences between Columns 1 and 2, with 
standard errors reported in parentheses below.  While there are slight differences in test score, gender, age, and 
likelihood of attending engineering college between located and non-located households, these differences are not 
systematically related to the score cutoffs.
21
When only the parents were found, we used data from the parents’ survey to supplement the applicant’s 
outcome information, and vice versa.  To confidently use this method, we would expect that parents and children 
would be able to accurately answer questions regarding one another.  Appendix Table 2 confirms that they do, 
showing high correlations between answers given by the child and his/her parent for key questions, such as father’s 




Who applies to engineering colleges? Who gains admission due to the reservation policy? 
Table 1A reports on the socio-economic background of our survey respondents.  For variables on family 
background, data from the parent survey were used when available; when the parent survey data were missing, data 
from the applicant survey were used.  For the variables containing personal information on the applicant, data 
primarily come from the applicant survey; for cases in which the applicant was not found, the variable takes on the 
value of the equivalent question in the parent survey.  Column 1 reports means for the entire sample; columns 2, 3, 
and 4 report means for upper-caste, OBC and SC groups, respectively. The p-values for comparisons of means 
across groups are reported in the remaining columns of Table 1A.   Panel A focuses on characteristics of the main 
 
21 There have been a series of studies on attrition in developing countries, and they have concluded that survey attrition due to 
death or migration (even as high as 50 percent) has little impact on coefficient estimates (Fitzgerald et al, 1998, Falaris 2003).   12
                                                
income earner in each applicant’s household (as of 1996), while Panel B provides some background information 
about the applicants themselves.  One star indicates significance at the 10 percent level, two stars indicate 
significance at the 5 percent level, and three stars indicate significance at the 1 percent level. 
As a benchmark, we also provide in Table 1B socio-economic information for households from the urban 
areas of the Indian state where our research occurs.  This table was constructed from the 55
th round of the National 
Sample Survey of India (NSS) that was conducted in 1999-2000.  Unfortunately, the NSS does not contain all 
background variables we collected in our survey.  Thus, Table 1B lists the following variables from the NSS that 
are most equivalent to the data we collected: a dummy variable for whether the head of household’s education was 
below a graduate degree, a dummy variable for whether the head of household worked regularly, monthly 
consumption expenditures (in Rs 1999), and a dummy for whether the head of household works as an engineer. The 
column structure of Table 1B is identical to that of Table 1A.   
Not surprisingly, applicants to engineering colleges are positively selected compared to other individuals in 
the state.  While 80 percent of household heads in the NSS did not complete a graduate degree (where a graduate 
degree is equivalent to a U.S. college degree), this fraction is only 36 percent among applicants’ households.  
Applicants to engineering colleges are also more likely to be part of a household in which the head is employed.
22  
Finally, there is strong inter-generational correlation in career choice: while only about 1 percent of the households 
in the NSS are headed by engineers, 13 percent of the applicants to engineering colleges originate from households 
in which the head was an engineer. 
Table 1B shows that the average lower-caste household in the state we study is relatively less educated and 
financially worse off than the average upper-caste household.  Eighty-nine percent of heads of OBC households and 
94 percent of heads of SC households have not completed a graduate degree, compared to 70 percent among upper-
caste households. Upper-caste households in the NSS also report higher levels of monthly consumption 
expenditures: they consume about 33 percent more than OBC households and 60 percent more than SC households. 
Finally, engineers are more common household heads among the upper-caste group (2 percent) than among the 
OBC and SC groups (1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively).  
 
22 Note that the employment status question in the NSS is not completely equivalent to the employment status question in our 
survey.   13
A comparison of the information in Tables 1A and 1B shows that the positive selection among applicants to 
engineering colleges occurs across all three caste groups. Importantly, though, the positive selection among OBC 
and SC applicants is not so severe that their background characteristics become similar to those of the upper-caste 
applicants. Instead, there remain large and statistically significant differences in socio-economic background 
between the lower- and upper-caste groups (Table 1A).  For example, 30 percent of heads of upper-caste 
households have at least a master’s degree, compared to 16 and 13 percent for OBC and SC households, 
respectively. There are also systematic differences in parental income across the three groups, with heads of lower-
caste households earning 30 to 40 percent less than heads of upper-caste households.  Furthermore, lower-caste 
applicants are less likely to have attended an English-language private school and more likely to have attended a 
government school. While OBC applicants are better off than SC applicants, on average, the “economic distance” 
between these two types of applicants is smaller than the distance between the average upper-caste and average 
lower-caste applicant; this is especially true with regard to parental education and income. Table 1A also shows that 
lower-caste applicants are typically older and have more siblings. Finally, a larger fraction of lower-caste applicants 
are males. 
The systematic differences we observe in the socio-economic background of applicants of different castes 
are relevant in light of the active debate over who benefits from affirmative action programs in India. The summary 
statistics in Table 1A suggest that, in this particular context at least, targeting applicants from lower castes also 
results in targeting applicants who are economically less advantaged.  
To more formally analyze this issue, we compare the socio-economic characteristics of the applicants 
offered a seat in an engineering college in 1996 due to the reservation program to the characteristics of those that 
were refused a seat but would have been admitted in the absence of the program.  To perform this exercise, we 
make several assumptions.  First, we assume that the number of applicants in each caste category, as well as their 
exam score, would be unaffected by the removal of affirmative action.  Second, we assume that the total number of 
available seats in engineering colleges would remain the same in the absence of affirmative action. Finally, we also 
need to make an assumption about what the enrollment rate would be among those who would be offered a seat in 
the absence of affirmative action.  The exam data show that the average enrollment rate is about 50 percent for the 
upper-caste group.  However, admissions are made on a rolling basis and the rate is closer to 60-70 percent for   14
those who were informed earlier of their acceptance. Therefore, we consider two different scenarios: 50 and 70 
percent enrollment rates. 
With these assumptions, we can calculate the score on the entry exam that would have been the threshold 
for admission in the absence of the reservation policy—that is, in an environment in which all applicants are ranked 
on the same list.  This threshold score is, by construction, higher when we assume a 70 percent rate than when we 
assume a 50 percent rate.  Using the respondents’ score on the entry exam, we can then identify the individuals who 
would have been admitted in the absence of the reservation policy and those who would not have been admitted.  
We can also compare the socio-economic background of those who would have been admitted but were not (e.g. 
the “displaced”) and those who would not have been admitted but were (e.g. the “displacing”).  We present this 
comparison in Table 2.   We assume a 50 percent enrollment rate in Columns 1 through 3, and a 70 percent rate in 
Columns 4 through 6. Columns 1 and 4 report average background characteristics for displaced applicants, while 
Columns 2 and 5 report average background characteristics for displacing applicants.  We report the p-values for 
tests of comparison of means in Columns 3 and 6.  The background characteristics we consider are the same as in 
Table 1A. 
Table 2 confirms that the reservation policy is associated with the admission of individuals of a lower 
socio-economic background. Under the assumption of a 70 percent enrollment rate, mean parental income among 
the displaced individuals is Rs 14,088 compared to Rs 8,340 among the displacing individuals; 41 percent of 
displaced individuals come from a household in which the head holds at least a master’s degree, compared to only 
14 percent of displacing individuals; also, 59 percent of displaced individuals attended an English-language private 
school, compared to only 35 percent of displacing individuals. Not surprisingly, the economic magnitude of the 
difference between displacing and displaced individuals is smaller under the assumption of a 50 percent rate than 
under the assumption of a 70 percent rate, as the former assumption implies a lower threshold for admission and, 
hence, draws fewer of the displaced students from the (economically better-off) general caste category. Even under 
the 50 percent assumption, there is no evidence that the caste reservation policy discriminates against the 
economically weak, as some opponents of this policy have argued.  
However, we find that the policy appears to hurt female applicants. This pattern emerges regardless of the 
enrollment rate assumed, but is only statistically significant under the assumption of a 50 percent rate.  Under the   15
                                                
assumption of the 50 percent rate, 73 percent of those “displaced” by the reservation policy are males, compared to 
84 percent of those “displacing.”  This finding is not surprising given that the share of female applicants is higher in 
the upper-caste group than in the OBC and SC groups.
23  This suggests that the targeting of lower castes may 
negatively interact with the advancement of women on the engineering career track. 
 
Summary Statistics: Labor Market Outcomes and Attitudes by Caste Category 
In Table 3, we summarize our main outcome variables.  For each variable, we report average outcomes across all 
survey respondents—that is, whether or not they were admitted and whether or not they went to an engineering 
college—for the full sample (Column 1), for the upper-caste group (Column 2), for the aggregated lower-caste 
group (OBC plus SC, Column 3), as well as for OBC and SC (Columns 4 and 5, respectively).  In Column 6, we 
report the p-value of a comparison of means between the upper- and aggregated lower-caste groups.  
At the time of survey, lower-caste applicants, and especially SC applicants, are on average economically 
worse off as compared to upper-caste applicants. Eighty-one percent of the upper-caste applicants are employed 
compared to only 69 percent of the lower-caste applicants.  The employment rate for SC applicants is especially 
low (58 percent).  While OBC applicants do not differ much from the upper caste in terms of their employment 
rate, their income is substantially lower (Rs 12,361 per month for OBC compared to Rs 17,706 for the upper-caste 
group).  Unemployed individuals have “zero” income, and therefore it is unsurprising that the SC members, who 
have a relatively lower employment rate, also have a much lower income (Rs 5,630) than the other groups. 
Lower-caste and upper-caste applicants also hold different types of jobs. Upper-caste applicants are more 
likely to work as engineers and to be employed in the private sector; they are also more likely to use a computer at 
work and to speak English on the job.  These differences are especially salient for the SC group. For example, 65 
percent of upper-caste applicants use a computer at their current job, compared to only 31 percent of SC applicants; 
47 percent of upper-caste applicants work as engineers, compared to only 28 percent of SC applicants. Also (and 
possibly related), SC respondents are much less likely to view their job as “a success.”
24  There are no statistically 
 
23 Henriques and Wankhede (1985) find that individuals from lower-caste groups that complete secondary school 
disproportionately tend to be male.  Thus, it follows that college applicants from these lower-caste groups would also 
disproportionately tend to be male. 
24 The measure “Strongly agrees—views job as successful” is an index where one point is assigned for each of the following 
statements with which the individual strong agrees:  The chances of promotion at work are good, promotions are handled   16
                                                                                                                                                                           
significant differences across the groups in the likelihood of having relied on social networks (friends and family) 
to find their current or last job, even though the averages point towards slightly less use of social networks among 
SC applicants (7 percent, compared to 11 percent among upper-caste applicants).  
We also included a series of more subjective questions in the survey to gauge respondents’ level of civic 
engagement, social identity and attitudes towards affirmative action programs.  These questions were only asked to 
the children and not to their parents, as we thought it would be difficult for parents to provide answers about how 
their children “feel” on these subjective dimensions; sample sizes are therefore smaller for this last set of variables. 
“Participates in government” is an indicator variable for whether the individual has voted in the last election or 
donated money to a political party. According to this measure, there is a higher level of civic engagement in the 
lower-caste than in the upper-caste group.  The variable “Index of caste identity” aggregates four questions on caste 
identity into a single index.  Specifically, it is a categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 4 and is defined as the 
sum of the following binary variables: belongs to BJP (a Hindu Nationalist Political Party), attends religious 
activity at least once a month, donates to religious organizations, and belongs to a caste association. The mean of 
this index variable is quite low on average (1.10); the mean is higher for lower-caste applicants (1.16 versus 0.98), 
suggesting they might have a stronger sense of their caste and religious identity.  Lower-caste applicants also report 
stronger support for reservation policies. This is true, perhaps not surprisingly, for reservations that favor lower 
castes but also for reservations that favor females. For example, 64 percent of SC applicants, but only 40 percent of 
upper-caste applicants, agree with reservations for females in engineering colleges. 
 
Labor Market Effects: OLS Estimates 
In Table 4, we report OLS estimates of the impact of attending an engineering college (wenti) on labor market 
outcomes: 
Outcomei = β0+ β1wenti + β2 Xi + εi                                                                                                   (1) 
We present these estimates for the full sample of respondents (Panel A), but also separately for the upper-caste 
group (Panel B) and lower-caste groups (OBC+SC in Panel C, OBC only in Panel D and SC only in Panel E).  The 
outcomes we focus on are whether the individual is employed at the time of survey (Columns 1 and 2), monthly 
 
fairly, the people at work take a personal interest in me, working in groups is important in getting work done right, my 
supervisor is helpful in getting the job done, and overall I am satisfied with the work environment.   17
income in Rs (Columns 3 and 4), the logarithm of monthly income (Columns 5 and 6), and a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the individual earns less per month than the median income in the full sample of respondents and zero 
otherwise (Columns 7 and 8). For each outcome variable, we report the results of two regression models: one in 
which we only control for a vector of individual characteristics (odd columns) and one in which we control for 
individual characteristics, household characteristics, and city of origin (even columns). The individual-level 
controls are dummies for OBC and SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age, and dummies for the type 
of secondary school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school, or government school). The 
household-level controls are household-head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies for the educational 
attainment of the household head, a dummy for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy for whether or 
not the household head uses a computer at work, and the number of other children in the household.  We also 
control for whether the data come from the parent or child survey in all regressions. 
In the full sample (Panel A), we find that individuals who started engineering school in 1996 are about 6 
percentage points more likely to be employed at the time of our survey (Column 1) and earn between Rs 3,500 to 
Rs 4,000 more per month (Columns 3-4); they are also about 10 percentage points less likely to have earnings that 
are below the sample median (Columns 7-8). The addition of controls for household characteristics tends to reduce 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, but the changes are economically small and are not statistically 
significant. 
In Panels B and C, we compare OLS estimates of the returns to attending engineering college between the 
upper- and aggregated lower-caste groups. Employment effects (Columns 1 and 2) are of similar magnitude for 
both groups (about 5 percent) but are noisily estimated. Income-level effects are statistically significant for both 
groups but are larger in magnitude for upper-caste applicants. Attending engineering college in the state in 1996 is 
associated with an additional Rs 5,400 per month for upper-caste applicants and Rs 3,200 for lower-caste applicants 
in the econometric specification in which we only control for individual-level characteristics. The difference is 
smaller (Rs 3,700 versus Rs 2,700) in the specification in which we also control for household-level characteristics. 
Since the lower-caste group has lower earnings on average (Table 3), attending engineering school is associated 
with a higher percentage increase in income for that group. Specifically, attending engineering school increases 
monthly income by 80 to 90 percent for lower-caste respondents (statistically significant) compared to 50 to 70   18
percent for upper-caste respondents (not statistically significant); because standard errors are large, we cannot 
statistically reject the hypothesis that these effects are of the same magnitude. For both the lower- and upper-caste 
groups, attending engineering college is associated with about a 10 percentage-point decrease in the likelihood of 
earning less than the sample median. 
Disaggregating the lower-caste applicants into OBC and SC (Panels D and E respectively), we find positive 
and significant income-level effects for both groups (Rs 3,900 for OBC and Rs 3,000 for SC) in the specification in 
which we only control for individual characteristics. The estimated effect for OBC becomes smaller when we add 
household-level controls; in contrast, the estimated effect for SC applicants is virtually unchanged with the addition 
of these controls. The estimated employment effects of attending engineering college are positive, but noisy. 
Attending engineering college is associated with 15 to 20 percent reduction in the likelihood of earning below-
median earnings for OBC applicants; in contrast, it does not lift SC applicants (who earn much less on average) 
from the bottom half of the earnings distribution in our sample. 
In summary, the OLS regressions reported in Table 4 suggest positive and significant returns to attending 
engineering college, even in the lower-caste groups.  In particular, even among SC applicants, who are 
characterized by much weaker socio-economic background and much lower test scores at entry, we find a positive 
association between attending engineering school and current income level. This contradicts the extreme view that 
seats in engineering colleges are “wasted” on lower-caste candidates because they do not have the preparation to 
utilize the engineering degree.  
From a welfare perspective, these OLS point estimates of income-level effects suggest that a seat in 
engineering college occupied by a lower-caste applicant yields lower economic returns than if that same seat was 
occupied by a general-caste applicant. Reserving seats to lower-caste applicants might reduce the returns on the 
investment made in engineering colleges. The OLS point estimates also suggest, however, that the reservation 
policy might succeed in minimizing inequalities between caste categories, as illustrated by the larger log (income) 
effects for the lower-caste groups.  It is worth stressing, however, that the large standard errors prevent us from 
drawing unequivocal conclusions. Another obvious limitation of the OLS estimates is that they do not 
unambiguously warrant a causal interpretation. We turn to this issue in the next section. 
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Labor Market Effects: IV Estimates 
Empirical Strategy 
While a natural starting point, the OLS results reported above are subject to important interpretational issues.  Our 
sample includes students who scored above and below the admission threshold in their caste category on the 1996 
entry exam. Part of the variation in who attended engineering college that we exploit in the OLS regressions is 
driven by variation in who scored above and below the admission threshold in their caste group, while another part 
of the variation is driven by one’s decision of whether or not to attend, conditional on having been admitted. This 
second source of variation is clearly problematic when one tries to measure the causal effect of attending 
engineering college.  First, suppose that only those applicants who saw the greatest return to going to engineering 
college did so.  In this case, we would clearly overestimate the causal effects of attending engineering college. 
Second, the decision of whether or not to attend, conditional on having been admitted, may be driven by liquidity 
constraints at the household level, with cash-constrained individuals not being able to forego several years of 
earnings in order to invest in education.
25  Third, the selection into attending, conditional on having been admitted, 
may also reflect variation in outside options. For example, suppose that a seat in medical school is preferred to a 
seat in engineering school; then only those who did not make it into medical school will attend engineering school. 
Hence, we have included among those who did not attend engineering school some individuals who went instead to 
medical school, leading us to underestimate the causal effect of attending engineering school. Furthermore, if there 
is systematic variation in the quality of these outside options across caste categories, this would invalidate any 
comparison of the OLS returns to attending engineering college across caste categories. For example, if upper-caste 
applicants systematically have superior outside options than lower-caste applicants, the OLS model might give us 
an underestimate of the difference in the returns between the upper- and lower-caste groups. 
In this section, we propose alternative estimates of the returns to attending engineering college that only 
rely on the first source of variation listed above: variation in who scored above and below the admission thresholds 
on the entry exam. Specifically, we will use score-cutoff dummies (cutoffi) as instruments for attending engineering 
college (wenti): 
                                                 
25 These first two sources of bias in the OLS estimates are possibly relatively less important in our research setting in that we 
focus on individuals who decided to apply to engineering college. For example, if applying is costly, one might expect only 
those without binding cash constraints to make that decision.   20
   wenti = β0+ β1cutoffi + β2Xi + εi                                                                                                          (2) 
 
 
Relying only on this source of variation allows us to rule out biases due to selection in the decision to attend, 
conditional on having been admitted.   
One remaining concern, of course, is that there are systematic unobservable differences between those who 
scored above and below the admission thresholds that would induce differences in their current labor-market 
outcomes, even in the absence of an engineering education.  We attempted to form a homogenous group of survey 
respondents, given our survey constraints.  Our sample is first limited to the group of individuals that passed the 
first-round 10+2 examinations.  We then limited our sample to those who scored in the upper half of the second-
round entrance exams.  Below, we formally test for whether our sample forms a homogenous group for a set of 
observable background characteristics.  We then go one step further and restrict the sample of survey respondents 
to those whose score on the entry exam is even closer to the cutoff for their caste category. In practice, we construct 
for each caste category a “discontinuity sample” in which we drop those survey respondents who scored below the 
25
th percentile or above the 75
th percentile of the score distribution of all those surveyed in their caste category. 
Thus, the test scores in the general-caste discontinuity sample range from the 85
th to the 97
th percentile of the 





nd percentile for the OBC and SC samples, respectively.  
As we just discussed, we start in Table 5 by testing whether, within each caste category, there are any 
systematic differences in pre-characteristics between those who score above and below the cutoff on the entry 
exam.  If there are no systematic differences in observable characteristics, one may feel more confident that there 
are no systematic differences in unobservable characteristics around that cutoff.  Each cell in Table 5 corresponds 
to a different regression.  Each regression relates the dependent variable in that row on the cutoff dummy that is 
relevant for the group in that column.  Reported in each cell is the estimated coefficient on the cutoff dummy, with 
standard errors in parentheses. When we pool both lower-caste groups together (Columns 3 and 4), we also include 
in each regression a dummy for OBC status. Odd columns focus on the full samples and even columns focus on the 
discontinuity samples.  
There are very few cases in which we find statistically significant differences between those applicants who 
are above the cutoff and those who are below. This is true in both samples.  Not surprisingly, in many cases the   21
magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the cutoff dummies are smaller in the discontinuity samples than in the 
full samples, but there are several exceptions.  To determine the joint significance of the cutoff variables on all of 
the outcomes, we estimated a SUR model; we list the chi-square statistic and p-value that tests for the joint 
significance of the cutoff variable in the SUR model in the final two rows of Table 5.  This test, and the other 
evidence reported in Table 5, confirms that applicants above and below the cutoff do not appear statistically 
different in terms of their background characteristics, thus providing some support for our strategy of using the 
score cutoff dummies as instruments for having attended engineering college. 
 
First- and Second-Stage Results  
We report the first-stage regressions in Table 6.  Panel A focuses on the upper-caste group, while Panel B focuses 
on the aggregated lower-caste sample.  Panel C focuses on the OBC group and Panel D on the SC group.  The 
dependent variable in all regressions is “went,” a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual enrolled in 
engineering college in 1996 in the state under study and 0 otherwise.  We consider six different models. Models 1 
through 4 use the full samples of survey respondents within a given caste category. Model 1 simply consists of 
regressing “went” on a dummy for the group-specific cutoff (as well as a dummy for the OBC category in Panel B).  
In Model 2, we also include the individual-level controls introduced in Table 4 and an indicator variable for 
whether the outcome variables come from the parent or applicant survey, while Model 3 includes the control 
variables from Model 2 plus the vector of household-level characteristics from Table 4.  Model 4 adds fixed effects 
for each applicant’s origin city.  Models 5 and 6 use the discontinuity samples, with Model 5 simply regressing 
“went” on a dummy for the group-specific cutoff and Model 6 replicating Model 4 (e.g. including the full list of 
controls). 
All of the first-stage regressions reported in Table 6 statistically confirm the strong association already 
observed in Figures 2A, 2B and 2C between the likelihood of attending engineering college in 1996 and scoring 
above the cutoff on the entry exam. Not surprisingly given our findings in Table 5, the addition of individual- and 
household-level characteristics to the econometric model barely changes the estimated coefficients on the cutoff 
variables in either the full sample or the discontinuity sample.    22
                                                
The smaller estimates on the cutoff dummy for upper-caste applicants compared to lower-caste applicants 
(Panel A versus Panel B) indicate that a smaller fraction of upper-caste admits end up attending engineering 
college.  This could possibly reflect the fact that the general-caste admits face a larger set of educational choices. 
Interestingly, though, among the lower-caste applicants, it is the OBC admits that end up attending engineering 
college at a much higher rate; the estimated coefficient on the cutoff dummy in the SC group is in fact comparable 
in magnitude to the estimated coefficient on the cutoff dummy for the non-minorities.
26  
We report the two-stage least squares estimates of the impact of attending engineering college on labor-
market outcomes in Table 7.  The outcomes we consider are the same as in the OLS regressions (Table 4): 
likelihood of employment, monthly income level, log (income), and a dummy for monthly income below the 
sample median.  We report the results for six different empirical models, which correspond to the first-stage 
specifications we presented in Table 6.  
Models 1 through 4 include all survey respondents in the regression analysis. One can see that the point 
estimates on the returns to attending engineering college are similar across four of these specifications.  The IV 
estimates tend to be larger than the OLS estimates presented in Table 4.  For example, attending engineering 
college is associated with about a 15 percent increase in the likelihood of employment for upper-caste applicants in 
the IV regressions, compared to only a 5 percent increase in the OLS regression. The same holds for lower-caste 
applicants, although for this group the IV estimates are only about twice the size of the OLS estimates (about 10 
percent versus 5 percent).  The pattern in the gap between the IV and OLS estimates also extends to monthly 
income level. Attending engineering college increases the monthly income of upper-caste individuals by between 
Rs 9,500 and Rs 13,000 (statistically significant in all four specifications); in contrast, attending engineering 
college increases the monthly income of lower-caste applicants by between Rs 5,500 and Rs 6,200 (statistically 
significant in all four specifications).  Hence, the point estimates in these IV specifications paint a less favorable 
picture of the welfare implications of the reservation policy: attending engineering college increases the monthly 
income of an upper-caste candidate by Rs 3,000 to Rs 7,000 more than it increases the monthly income of a lower-
 
26 One possible explanation for the higher yield rate among the OBC admits is that they have fewer chances of attending an 
engineering college outside the state, as the centrally-controlled engineering universities (like the prestigious IITs) only have 
reservations for the SC category (and ST category), and not the OBC category.   23
                                                
caste candidate.
27   This difference in income is marginally significant:  controlling for all background 
characteristics (Model 4 from Table 7), the difference in incomes between the upper- and lower- caste groups is 
about Rs 5000, significant at the 12 percent level.   
When we split the lower-caste group into OBC and SC candidates (Panels C and D respectively), one can 
see that the between-caste difference in the returns to an engineering education is especially large when we 
compare general-caste applicants to SC applicants.  In Models 1 through 4, attending engineering college increases 
the monthly income of SC applicants by only about Rs 3,500 to Rs 4,500 (statistically significant in all four 
specifications), compared to about Rs 6,300 to Rs 8,200 for OBC applicants (statistically significant in all four 
specifications). In general, the estimated effects on the other outcomes for SC applicants, while all of the expected 
sign, are noisy.   Interestingly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the returns between the upper-caste group and 
OBC are the same.  However, controlling for all background characteristics (Model 4 from Table 7), we find that 
the upper caste experience a Rs 6,900 higher return to admittance relative to the SC group (significant at the 15 
percent level).  Remember that the OBC, while of a lower socio-economic background, are much more similar in 
background characteristics to the upper-caste group than the SC.  Thus, this begins to suggest that most of the costs 
of affirmative action come from admitting those from a much lower socio-economic background.  We will more 
formally test this hypothesis in Table 9.  
In Columns 5 and 6, we present results from the analysis of the discontinuity samples, in which we drop the 
top 25 percent and bottom 25 percent of scores in each caste group.  Unfortunately, the estimated effects are noisy.  
Only one estimated coefficient is statistically significant at standard levels; namely, in Model 5, we find that 
attending engineering school reduces by 30 percent the likelihood that an OBC individual will earn below-median 
income.  This lack of power is, in part, a reflection of the small sample sizes in the discontinuity regressions.  In 
terms of magnitude, though, the point estimates in Columns 5 and 6 are roughly consistent with those in Columns 1 
through 4: there are positive returns to attending engineering college even among the lower-caste groups that scored 
very poorly on the entry exam; attending engineering college increases the monthly income of a upper-caste 
candidate by about Rs 8,000 more than a lower-caste candidate (Panel A versus Panel B). However, in contrast with 
 
27 Of course, the economic costs could be even higher if the program moves individuals from attending government schools to 
attending private colleges.   24
                                                
Columns 1 through 4, we see less evidence in these columns of superior returns for OBC applicants relative to SC 
applicants.  
In Table 8, we replicate the IV models estimated in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 7, but also include a 
quadratic control for the individual’s test score on the entry exam (score and score
2) in each model.
28 We compare 
upper- to lower-caste applicants (Panels A and B, respectively).  We report in the first row of each panel the 
estimated coefficient on the threshold dummy in the relevant first-stage regression.  In general, the estimated 
coefficients for the lower-caste groups (Panel B) are similar in economic magnitude to the results in Table 7, 
suggesting positive returns to attending engineering college for lower-caste applicants.  However, the standard 
errors increase in size.  The most statistically significant and stable patterns across models are a positive impact of 
attending college on the logarithm of monthly income for lower-caste applicants, and a negative impact on the 
likelihood of their earning below-median income.  The estimated effects for the upper-caste applicants appear much 
less stable (Panel A) and we lose power in the first stage.  Comparing Panels A and B, the estimated effects in 
Columns 1 and 3 are still consistent with the idea that upper-caste applicants obtain higher gains in income level 
from attending engineering school, with differences ranging between Rs 6,000 and Rs 13,000.  However, as in the 
discontinuity sample analysis in Table 7, this comparison relies on estimates that are very imprecise. Maybe 
pointing towards the limits of our data and research design, the point estimate of attending an engineering college 
on income falls to about Rs 5000 for the upper caste group in Column 4 when we further include fixed effects for 
origin city of the applicant, with very large standard errors.  
In summary, the findings in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that, contrary to the arguments of some critics of 
affirmative action, lower-caste applicants derive positive returns from affirmative action.  However, the bulk (but 
not all) of the evidence in these tables also suggests some aggregate costs to these programs: allowing an upper-
caste applicant to occupy a seat that has been reserved for a lower-caste applicant would boost aggregate income.  
In Table 9, we investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the income effects we estimate based on the 
socio-economic background of the applicants.  To proceed, we first summarize a given individual’s socio-economic 
background characteristics into a single index. We do this by regressing a given individual’s test score on the vector 
 
28 It is unclear whether the quadratic is the right fit, given the shape of the data distributions shown in Figure 2.  Moreover, in 
the first stage regressions, the score and score
2 variables are not significant predictors of attending the engineering colleges.  
Nonetheless, we present this analysis for completeness.   25
                                                
of individual and household background variables introduced above; from this estimation, we compute a predicted 
test score variable and assign each individual a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual’s predicted test score 
is below the median within her caste category and 0 otherwise. We then replicate in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 the 
IV models estimated in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 7 but add to the models an interaction term between going to 
engineering college and the “below median predicted score” dummy.
29 Column 3 of Table 9 replicates Column 1 
but replaces the predicted test score dummy with the continuous predicted test score variable.   
The most striking finding in Table 9 is for lower-caste applicants (Panel B). For this group, we find very 
different returns to attending engineering college by socio-economic background. Applicants who come from a 
better background benefit more from attending engineering college than those from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds.  This pattern holds in all three columns of Table 9. In fact, our estimates indicate very small returns to 
attending engineering school among those lower-caste applicants who come from poorer backgrounds. This 
suggests some strong complementarities between education and socio-economic background for lower-caste 
candidates. In contrast, we see no such complementarities for upper-caste applicants. In fact, the effects we estimate 
point toward higher returns to attending engineering college among the upper-caste applicants coming from poorer 
socio-economic backgrounds.
30
Hence, the findings in Table 9 paint a somewhat less optimistic picture of the reservation policy when it 
comes to benefiting lower-income groups (and not just lower-caste groups). Specifically, while we showed earlier 
(in Table 2) that the targeting of lower-caste groups does lead to the admission of students of a lower socio-
economic background, Table 9 suggests that the reservation policy may provide greater benefits to those who are 
already economically better-off within the lower-caste groups.  We can hypothesize on possible channels through 
which socio-economic status (SES) may continue to affect outcomes, post-admission. First, higher SES lower-caste 
members may find it easier to make it through college. For example, they may not need to work during college or 
they may be better able to draw upon friends and family in the learning process. Second, higher SES lower-caste 
 
29 We of course also include the “below median predicted score” dummy as a direct control. The estimation of the 2SLS 
models now relies on two instruments: the score threshold dummy and the score threshold dummy interacted with the “below 
median predicted score” dummy. 
30 These results are not surprising in light of the fact that we see higher level returns for the OBC group than the SC group.   
Furthermore, if we look within the OBC and SC groups, we find that most of the gains within group are also concentrated 
among those who are from a higher socioeconomic background. 
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members may find the post-graduation job market easier to navigate. For example, their social networks may help 
them take better advantage of their degree.  
 
Other Outcome Variables 
In the final two tables, we extend the analysis to other outcome variables besides employment and income. Table 
10 reports on various job characteristics and Table 11 reports on variables related to one’s social network as well as 
on a set of beliefs and attitudes.  For brevity, we only present IV estimates for these outcomes.  Tables 10 and 11 
follow the same structure as Table 7.  For each dependent variable of interest (as listed in the first column), we 
present the results of six different models corresponding to the six first-stage specifications from Table 6. Each cell 
corresponds to a separate regression and reported in the cell is the estimated coefficient on “went to engineering 
college” (with standard errors in parentheses). In both tables, Panel A focuses on the upper-caste sample and Panel 
B on the aggregated lower-caste sample.  
Table 10 suggests that attending engineering college has a strictly positive, but smaller, impact on one’s 
likelihood of working as an engineer for lower-caste compared to upper-caste individuals (Row 1).  More generally, 
the likelihood of working in an advanced technical field, which we proxy for by one’s using a computer at work, is 
only at most 11 percentage points higher for those in the lower-caste group that attended engineering school (not 
statistically significant), compared to about 30 percentage points higher for those in the upper-caste group 
(statistically significant in all specifications). Other job characteristics also suggest a differential impact on job 
quality between lower-caste and upper-caste applicants.  While attending engineering school increases the 
likelihood of one’s using English at work for both groups, this effect is larger in magnitude in the upper-caste 
group.
31 More generally, engineering school increases one’s level of job satisfaction (as measured by the index 
variable “strongly agrees – views job as successful”) more for general-caste compared to lower-caste members.
32 
We interpret these results as consistent with our earlier findings that lower-caste candidates do benefit from 
attending engineering college, but that the benefits they receive from this education do not match the benefits that 
“displaced” upper-caste applicants might have gotten, absent the policy. 
 
31 This effect however loses economic and statistical significance among lower-caste applicants when we focus on the 
discontinuity sample (Models 5 and 6).   
32 Again, the effect loses statistical (Models 5 and 6) and economic (Model 6) significance for lower-caste applicants in the 
discontinuity sample.    27
                                                
In the remaining rows of Table 10, we study the impact of attending engineering school on whether one 
works in the private sector, works in the public sector, is self-employed, or works in a family business.
33 Both 
lower- and upper-caste members see their likelihood of being self-employed or working in a family business 
decline by about the same amount (10 percentage points) after attending engineering college.  Most of the extra 
employment generated among general-caste members is in the private sector. For lower-caste members, the point 
estimates indicate higher employment in both the private and government sectors, but these estimates are very 
noisy. The growth in public-sector employment, however, suggests that part of the positive employment effects of 
attending engineering college for lower-caste candidates may be linked to other affirmative action programs in the 
labor market.  
Finally, Table 11 studies whether and how attending engineering college affects one’s social networks and 
other variables such one’s self-reported level of civic engagement, social identity, and attitudes towards affirmative 
action programs, as defined in Section III and Table 3. The first variable we examine is whether a given individual 
used friends and family to find his or her current or last job. Interestingly, among upper-caste candidates, having 
attended engineering school appears to be a substitute for relying on social networks when searching for a job; we 
find no such substitution pattern in the lower-caste groups.  Controlling for all background characteristics (Model 
4), the difference in the coefficients between the upper- and lower-caste groups is significant at the 5 percent level.  
There are many possible interpretations for this finding.  One possibility is that upper-caste applicants can 
compensate for the lack of a good education by relying on well-connected friends and family members to find a 
job, but that this compensation mechanism does not exist for lower-caste applicants.  Another possibility is that 
lower-caste applicants derive value from the assistance of well-connected friends and family members in their job 
search, even when they have attended engineering school, maybe because their educational background carries less 
weight among employers.  
Next, we examine whether attending engineering school changes the strength of one’s caste identity. We 
find no meaningful effect; the point estimates are negative across all regressions and panels, indicating weaker caste 
identity among those who attended engineering college, but none of the estimated coefficients reach standard levels 
of statistical significance.   
 
33 The missing category is “working for an NGO.”   28
In the next four rows of Table 11, we study respondents’ opinions towards various affirmative action 
programs.  Overall, among general-caste respondents, we do not find much systematic difference in opinions 
between the candidates who attended engineering college and those who did not. So, in particular, it does not 
appear that those who are denied a seat in an engineering college due to the affirmative action program end up 
expressing more negative attitudes towards these programs. While still quite mixed, we find somewhat more 
compelling evidence of higher support for reservation policies among the lower-caste applicants who got to attend 
engineering school. Surprisingly, though, what appears to drive this higher support is a more favorable attitude 
towards reservation policies for females, and especially reservation policies for females in engineering schools; in 
contrast, we find no robust evidence that the lower-caste applicants who were offered a seat in an engineering 
college end up expressing more (or less) support for the specific reservation program that let them into college. 
Finally, in the last row of Table 11, we investigate possible effects on civic engagement. Recall that 
“participates in government” is a variable that captures whether the individual voted in the last election or donated 
money to a political party. All but one of the point estimates are negative, but none are statistically significant.  
Overall, Table 11 indicates little robust effect of going to engineering college on one’s caste attitude, 
opinions towards affirmative action programs, or level of civic engagement. While the existence of affirmative 
action for minorities in engineering schools may shift overall attitudes towards caste or other affirmative action 
policies, we do not find strong differential shifts between those who were above or below the admission threshold 
in their caste category.  Specifically, we find little evidence that the upper-caste group members who “lose out” due 
to these programs end up with more negative attitudes towards lower castes or more negative attitudes towards 
affirmative action programs. At best, there might be some sign of a more favorable attitude towards the reservation 
policies among those lower-caste candidates who directly experienced the benefit of these policies. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that the affirmative action policy redistributes resources to minority groups.  Contrary to the 
arguments of some critics, the policy does not merely crowd out economically-disadvantaged upper-caste students 
to make way for economically-advantaged lower-caste students. The individuals who are displaced by the program 
come from stronger socio-economic backgrounds than the displacers. Hence, by targeting disadvantaged caste   29
groups, the policy achieves some income targeting without generating any of the behavioral distortions typically 
associated with income targeting.  Moreover, despite their low test scores, the marginal admits from lower castes 
earned significant returns from attending engineering college.  In other words, our findings do not support the view 
that the academic resources that are devoted to the lower-caste students are totally wasted on them.  
However, we also identify efficiency costs of the program and limitations to its ability to redistribute. First, 
like other redistributive programs, the affirmative action policy comes at an economic cost in that the marginal 
lower-caste admit experiences a smaller income increase than the increase that would have been experienced by the 
marginal general-caste admit.  In this particular context, we find that for 1 Rupee lost to the upper caste, the lower-
caste members gain 0.4 to 0.6 Rs (using the point estimates from our preferred specifications in Table 7).  Second, 
and most troublesome, our results suggest that among the lower-caste admits, it is those from stronger socio-
economic backgrounds who benefit most from the reservation policy. This result somewhat weakens the case that 
the policy benefits the economically disadvantaged.   
This study contributes to the literature on affirmative action by taking advantage of both a straightforward 
policy experiment and a comprehensive dataset that provides information not only on the individuals who obtained 
admissions to higher education due to affirmative action, but also on those who were denied admissions as a result 
of affirmative action.  Our findings also offer clear directions for future work. First, our analysis focuses on 
educational reservations in one state and one field (engineering).  We see great value in replications of this research 
in other educational fields and other regions: relationships between advantaged and disadvantaged groups vary 
greatly across regions, and the nature of the educational production function may also vary significantly across 
fields.  Second, our research suggests the economic and redistributive trade-offs that are involved in affirmative 
action.  Future research should be prepared to further understand these social costs, and to compare affirmative 
action policies to other approaches with similar social objectives. 
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1. The figures provide the distribution of test scores for applicants to engineering colleges in 1996, by caste group.
C.  Scheduled Castes
A.  Upper Caste Groups
Figure 1:  Score on Admissions Exam in 1996, by Category
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1. The figures graph the percentage of applicants who attended engineering college in 1996 by test score for each caste 
group.  
C.  Scheduled Castes
A.  Upper Caste Groups
Figure 2:  Percentage of Applicants Who Attended Engineering University in 1996, by Score and Category

































0 200 400 600 800Full Sample Upper Caste OBC SC UC Vs OBC UC Vs SC OBC Vs SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Below Graduate Degree 0.36 0.21 0.43 0.53 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.08*
Above Master's Degree 0.21 0.30 0.16 0.13 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.46
Employed 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.83 0.49 0.65
Income 10324.77 12790.86 8947.84 8081.25 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.26
Log(Income) 9.02 9.26 8.90 8.78 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.08*
Engineer 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.51 0.27 0.08*
Uses Computer in Job 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.23 0.03** 0.31
Number of other children 2.69 2.33 2.76 3.21 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Attended an English Private School 0.50 0.63 0.45 0.32 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01**
Attended a Government School 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.44 0.00*** 0.00***
Age 18.51 18.20 18.52 18.98 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Male 0.84 0.80 0.89 0.86 0.00*** 0.06** 0.32
Full Sample Upper Caste OBC SC UC Vs OBC UC Vs SC OBC Vs SC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HH Below Graduate Degree 0.80 0.70 0.89 0.94 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
HH Works Regularly 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.96 0.26 0.28
Monthly Consumption Expenditures 3452.04 4009.11 2995.30 2491.95 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
HH Engineer 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.02** 0.48
N 2911 1518 977 416 1393 977 1393
Notes:
4.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. Table 1A reports the mean background characterics of the applicants and their families in 1996.
2. Table 1B reports the mean background characteristics of a random sample of housheolds who live in urban areas of the state of India where our study occurs. The
data for this table comes from the National Sample Survey of India, 55th Round.  
3. Column 1 presents the mean for the full sample, while columns 2 - 3 report the means by caste groups. Columns 5 - 7 present p-values for the difference in means
between each of the indicated groups.
Means
Table 1A:  Comparing Pre-Characteristics Across Groups
Comparison of Means (p-value)
A.  Characteristics of Main Income Earner in Family in 1996
B.  Characteristics of Engineering Applicant
Table 1B:  Comparing Pre-Characteristics Across Groups in the NSS Round 55
Comparison of Means (p-value) Means(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Below Graduate Degree 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.24 0.47 0.07
Above Master's Degree 0.23 0.13 0.12 0.41 0.14 0.01***
Employed 0.97 0.98 0.73 1.00 0.97 0.47
Income 11098.28 7908.05 0.01** 14088.24 8340.00 0.00***
Log(Income) 9.07 8.82 0.02** 9.33 8.87 0.00***
Engineer 0.08 0.07 0.92 0.11 0.10 0.92
Uses Computer in Job 0.05 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.09 0.64
Number of other chlidren 2.49 3.18 0.01*** 1.76 3.16 0.00***
Attended an English Private School 0.54 0.33 0.01** 0.59 0.35 0.07*
Attended a Government School 0.07 0.28 0.00*** 0.00 0.27 0.02**
Age 18.25 18.76 0.02** 18.16 18.73 0.11
Male 0.73 0.84 0.10* 0.74 0.87 0.15
Notes:
3.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 2:  Comparing the Displaced with the Displacing
70% Yield
A.  Characteristics of Main Income Earner in Family in 1996












2. The sample only consists of those who were displaced or those who did the displacing. Columns 1- 3 assume a 50% percent rate of
acceptance of an admissions offer, providing a total sample size of 159. Column 1 presents the mean for the displaced, while column
2 reports the mean for the displacing. Column 3 presents the p-value of the difference in means. Columns 4-6 replicate Columns 1-3,
assuming a 70% yield (N=132).
1. This table compares mean background characteristics of individuals displaced by affirmative action polices ("displaced") and with




meansFull Sample Upper Caste Total OBC SC Upper vs. Lower
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employed 0.74 0.81 0.69 0.79 0.58 0.00***
(0.44) (0.39) (0.46) (0.41) (0.49)
721 308 413 213 200
Income 12637.22 17706.02 8995.69 12361.04 5630.35 0.00***
(14055.61) (15988.59) (11162.42) (12844.89) (7880.14)
653 273 380 190 190
Log(Income) 6.79 7.71 6.13 7.24 5.02 0.00***
(4.34) (4.06) (4.41) (4.04) (4.50)
653 273 380 190 190
Works as Engineer 0.41 0.47 0.37 0.46 0.28 0.01***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.45)
716 306 410 211 199
Works in Government Sector 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.01***
(0.34) (0.29) (0.37) (0.34) (0.40)
719 306 413 213 200
Works in Private Sector 0.46 0.57 0.37 0.47 0.27 0.00***
(0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.45)
719 306 413 213 200
Self-Employed/Family-Employed 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.11
(0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.22)
719 306 413 213 200
Uses Computer in Job 0.51 0.65 0.43 0.58 0.31 0.00***
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46)
400 146 254 120 134
Uses English in Job 0.41 0.57 0.31 0.40 0.24 0.00***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.46) (0.49) (0.43)
407 150 257 121 136
Strongly Agrees--Views Job as Successful 1.75 2.04 1.58 2.01 1.20 0.03**
(2.05) (2.14) (1.99) (2.16) (1.75)
407 150 257 121 136
Notes:
2. Column 1 reports the mean for the full sample. Column 2 reports the mean for the upper caste caste groups. Column 3 presents the mean
outcomes for the pooled lower caste groups, while column 4 and 5 report the means for the two main lower caste categories, OBC and SC
respectively.  Column 6 reports the p-value of the difference in means between the upper and lower  caste groups.
4.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
B.  Employment Characteristics
Table 3: Mean of Outcomes, By Category
Lower Caste Groups
Means Comparison of 
Means (p-value)
A.  Employment and Income
3. The measure “Strongly agrees—views job as successful” is an index where one point is assigned for each of the following statements with
which the individual strong agrees: The chances of promotion at work are good, promotions are handled fairly, the people at work take a
personal interest in me, working in groups is important in getting work done right, my supervisor is helpful in getting the job done, and
overall I am satisfied with the work environment. “Participates in government” is an indicator variable for whether the individual has voted
in the last election or donated money to a political party. According to this measure, there is a higher level of civic engagement in the
minority groups than in the non-minority group. The variable “Index of caste category” is a categorical variable that is defined as the sum of
the following 0/1 variables: belongs to BJP (a Hindu Nationalist Political Party), attends religious activity at least once a month, donates to
religious organizations, and belongs to caste association. The “Reservations Index” is a categorical variable that is the sum of 0/1 variables
on reservations listed in the table.
1. This table reports mean outcome variables, by caste group. Standard deviations are in parenthesis; the sample size for each variable is
listed below each mean and standard deviation. Full Sample Upper Caste Total OBC SC Upper vs. Lower
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family or Friends Helped Find Job 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.64
(0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.33) (0.25)
706 304 402 206 196
Participates in Government 0.78 0.69 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.00***
(0.42) (0.47) (0.37) (0.41) (0.33)
407 150 257 121 136
Index of Caste Identity 1.10 0.98 1.16 1.20 1.13 0.05*
(0.93) (0.89) (0.95) (0.97) (0.93)
407 150 257 121 136
Reservation Index 1.58 1.22 1.79 1.53 2.02 0.00***
(1.21) (1.14) (1.19) (1.19) (1.15)
383 137 246 116 130
0.61 0.52 0.66 0.59 0.72 0.01***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45)
383 137 246 116 130
0.52 0.40 0.58 0.51 0.64 0.00***
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
389 141 248 117 131
0.46 0.30 0.55 0.42 0.66 0.00***
(0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47)
385 141 244 116 128
Notes:
4.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Reservations for Minorities in Engineering 
Universities Fair
Table 3: Mean of Outcomes, By Category (Continued)
Means Comparison of 
Means (p-value)
C.  Social Networks and Beliefs
3. The measure “Strongly agrees—views job as successful” is an index where one point is assigned for each of the following statements with
which the individual strong agrees: The chances of promotion at work are good, promotions are handled fairly, the people at work take a
personal interest in me, working in groups is important in getting work done right, my supervisor is helpful in getting the job done, and
overall I am satisfied with the work environment. “Participates in government” is an indicator variable for whether the individual has voted
in the last election or donated money to a political party. According to this measure, there is a higher level of civic engagement in the
minority groups than in the non-minority group. The variable “Index of caste category” is a categorical variable that is defined as the sum of
the following 0/1 variables: belongs to BJP (a Hindu Nationalist Political Party), attends religious activity at least once a month, donates to
religious organizations, and belongs to caste association. The “Reservations Index” is a categorical variable that is the sum of 0/1 variables
on reservations listed in the table.
Lower Caste Groups
1. This table reports mean outcome variables, by caste group. Standard deviations are in parenthesis; the sample size for each variable is
listed below each mean and standard deviation.  
2. Column 1 reports the mean for the full sample. Column 2 reports the mean for the upper caste caste groups. Column 3 presents the mean
outcomes for the pooled lower caste groups, while column 4 and 5 report the means for the two main lower caste categories, OBC and SC
respectively.  Column 6 reports the p-value of the difference in means between the upper and lower  caste groups.
Agrees with Reservations for Females in 
Government
Agrees with Reservations for Females in 
Engineering UniversitiesOutcome:   Employed Employed Income Income Ln(Income) Ln(Income) Inc Below Med Inc Below Med
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:  Full Sample
went 0.06 0.05 3904.06 3292.12 0.82 0.69 -0.12 -0.1
(0.03)* (0.03) (1066.90)*** (1051.80)*** (0.34)** (0.35)** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Observations 721 720 653 652 653 652 653 652
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.22
Panel B:  Upper Caste Groups
went 0.06 0.04 5337.69 3685.44 0.74 0.46 -0.15 -0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (2012.20)*** (2066.57)* (0.51) (0.55) (0.06)** (0.06)
Observations 308 308 273 273 273 273 273 273
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.18
Panel C:  Lower Caste Groups(SC and OBC)
went 0.06 0.05 3118.64 2717.76 0.9 0.8 -0.11 -0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (1133.88)*** (1105.12)** (0.46)* (0.47)* (0.05)** (0.05)*
Observations 413 412 380 379 380 379 380 379
R-squared 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.23
Panel D:  OBC
went 0.07 0.05 3678.43 2290.94 0.84 0.6 -0.18 -0.13
(0.05) (0.06) (1882.79)* (1833.20) (0.58) (0.61) (0.07)** (0.07)*
Observations 213 212 190 189 190 189 190 189
R-squared 0.15 0.24 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.25 0.09 0.31
Panel E:  SC
went 0.07 0.07 2962.11 3193.08 1.08 1.09 -0.04 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (1253.28)** (1280.55)** (0.72) (0.76) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 200 200 190 190 190 190 190 190
R-squared 0.04 0.1 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.17
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Household Controls YES YES YES YES
City Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Notes:
4. Standard errors in parentheses.  The number of observations and the R^2 of the regression are listed below the standard errors.
5.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 4: OLS Regressions - Labor Market Outcomes
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate regression in which the dependent variable is either employed, income, log(income), or income
below median, as indicated.  The reported coefficient is on “went to engineering college.”
2. In Panel A, the sample includes all individuals. The sample in Panel B includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel C includes lower
caste applicants.  Panel D & E disaggregate the minority groups by the two main categories (OBC and SC).
3. The individual-level controls are dummies for OBC and SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age, dummies for the type of secondary
school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school or government school), and controls for whether or not the outcome data comes from
the parent or child survey. The household-level controls are household head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies for the educational attainment
of the household head, a dummy variable for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy for whether or not the household head uses a
computer at work, and the number of other children in the household.Sample: Full Disc Full  Disc Full Disc Full Disc
Pre-characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Below Graduate Degree -0.062 -0.077 -0.083 -0.082 -0.101 -0.081 -0.063 -0.083
(0.059) (0.084) (0.052) (0.074) (0.072) (0.103) (0.077) (0.159)
Above Master's Degree 0.015 -0.06 0.019 -0.046 0.061 -0.013 -0.027 -0.083
(0.056) (0.091) (0.038) (0.056) (0.054) (0.082) (0.052) (0.109)
Employed -0.01 -0.018 -0.014 0.003 -0.006 0.006 -0.024 -0.001
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.035) (0.023) (0.047)
Income 708.857 842.545 724.411 -584.429 1,445.27 390.686 -20.336 -1,515.64
(1,359.592) (2,258.617) (769.800) (1,004.810) (1,089.493) (1,171.333) (1,087.590) (2,299.199)
Log(Income) 0.118 0.094 0.131 0.007 0.142 0.079 0.12 -0.059
(0.080) (0.123) (0.070)* (0.095) (0.097) (0.131) (0.100) (0.210)
Engineer 0.023 0.006 0.024 0.022 0.047 0.025 0 0.018
(0.041) (0.118) (0.031) (0.040) (0.048) (0.064) (0.039) (0.081)
Uses Computer in Job 0.058 0.084 0.027 0.016 0.05 0.033 0.002 -0.002
(0.043) (0.058) (0.030) (0.044) (0.045) (0.067) (0.040) (0.083)
Number of Other Children -0.134 -0.048 -0.12 0.067 -0.26 -0.222 0.036 0.371
(0.130) (0.204) (0.152) (0.222) (0.191) (0.256) (0.242) (0.492)
Attended an English Private Schoo 0.058 0.102 0.052 0.033 0.096 0.06 0.003 0.004
(0.060) (0.092) (0.051) (0.075) (0.073) (0.105) (0.072) (0.149)
Attended a Government School 0.021 0.084 -0.006 -0.057 -0.023 -0.083 0.013 -0.029
(0.040) (0.057) (0.042) (0.059) (0.051) (0.071) (0.069) (0.143)
Age -0.079 -0.054 -0.087 0.023 0.192 0.207 -0.38 -0.154
(0.115) (0.202) (0.135) (0.185) (0.165) (0.241) (0.214)* (0.446)
Male 0.084 0.126 0.038 0.002 0.094 0.081 -0.02 -0.075
(0.047)* (0.073) (0.033) (0.047) (0.043)** (0.061) (0.049) (0.103)
Chi-squared 10.79 15.33 7.85 8.22 14.69 5.14 4.45 12.32
P-value 0.37 0.12 0.55 0.61 0.14 0.88 0.92 0.26
Notes:
B.  Characteristics of Engineering Applicant
OBC Scheduled Caste
Table 5: Comparing Pre-characteristics for Applicants Above and Below Threshold, by Category
A.  Characteristics of Main Income Earner in Family in 1996
Lower Caste
Upper Caste Total
1. Each cell contains the result of a separate regression in which the dependent variable is the pre-characteristic as indicated. The reported coefficient is on a
dummy variable for "above cutoff."  Standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the coefficient.
2. The sample in Column 1 is the full sample of upper caste groups. The sample in Column 2 is the discontinuity sample for upper caste groups where applicants
with the top 25% test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are excluded from the sample. The remaining columns replicate Columns 1 - 2 for pooled lower caste
groups (columns 3-4), the OBC (Columns 5-6), and the SC (Columns 7-8).
3. The Chi-squared and p-value of a SUR regression for joint significance are listed on the last two rows. Log(income) and Uses Computer in Job are excluded in
order to be able to run the SUR model.
4.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Upper Caste Groups
Cutoff 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.4 0.43
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)***
Observations 308 308 308 308 154 154
R-squared 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.13 0.24
Panel B: Lower Caste Groups (OBC and SC)
Cutoff 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.56 0.54
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
Observations 413 413 412 412 210 209
R-squared 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.4 0.48
Panel C: OBC 
Cutoff 0.78 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.7 0.73
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)***
Observations 213 213 212 212 107 106
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.54 0.64
Panel D: SC
Cutoff 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.42 0.38
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)***
Observations 200 200 200 200 103 103
R-squared 0.4 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.27 0.46
Sample FULL FULL FULL FULL DISC DISC
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES
Household Controls YES YES YES
City Fixed Effects YES YES
Notes:
Table 6:  First Stage Regressions
4. In the discontinuity sample, applicants with the top 25% test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are
excluded from the sample.  
5. Standard errors in parentheses. The number of observations and the R^2 of the regression are listed below the
standard errors.
6.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate regression in which the dependent variable is "went to
engineering college".  The reported coefficient is on “above cutoff for admissions.”
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower caste
applicants.  Panel C & D disaggregate the lower caste groups by the two main categories (OBC and SC).
3. The individual-level controls are dummies for OBC and SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age,
dummies for the type of secondary school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school or
government school), and controls for whether or not the outcome data comes from the parent or child survey. The
household-level controls are household head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies for the educational
attainment of the household head, a dummy variable for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy for
whether or not the household head uses a computer at work, and the number of other children in the household.Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  Upper Caste
Employed 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.02
(0.09)* (0.09)* (0.09)* (0.09) (0.18) (0.18)
Income 13002.05 11257.85 10189.39 8972.98 14338.38 12256.5
(3942.70)*** (3768.96)*** (3718.99)*** (3902.04)** (8729.81) (8533.27)
Log(Income) 2.23 1.97 1.95 1.53 1.00 0.85
(1.00)** (0.96)** (0.97)** (1.04) (2.02) (2.21)
Income Below Median -0.30 -0.25 -0.23 -0.13 -0.18 0.03
(0.11)*** (0.11)** (0.11)** (0.11) (0.24) (0.25)
Panel B: Lower Caste Groups (OBC and SC)
Employed 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.12 0.07
(0.07)* (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
Income 6202.71 5692.11 5571.66 5549.22 3729.23 4071.75
(1606.85)*** (1596.47)*** (1567.38)*** (1568.88)*** (2596.38) (2690.64)
Log(Income) 1.47 1.39 1.37 1.27 1.44 1.07
(0.65)** (0.65)** (0.66)** (0.67)* (1.08) (1.16)
Income Below Median -0.21 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19
(0.07)*** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.12) (0.12)
Panel C: OBC
Employed 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.06
(0.07)** (0.07)* (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
Income 8206.11 8050.48 6282.15 6343.35 3683.15 1605.28
(2431.53)*** (2417.61)*** (2332.41)*** (2354.71)*** (3595.66) (3864.82)
Log(Income) 1.99 1.53 1.35 1.14 1.58 0.66
(0.76)*** (0.74)** (0.77)* (0.77) (1.17) (1.26)
Income Below Median -0.35 -0.32 -0.26 -0.23 -0.31 -0.16
(0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)** (0.15)** (0.14)
Panel D: SC
Employed 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.1 0.06 -0.01
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23) (0.29)
Income 3610.12 3458.77 4448.97 3927.14 3799.93 2916.02
(1923.58)* (1986.11)* (2033.25)** (2004.06)* (3509.00) (4089.24)
Log(Income) 0.79 1.24 1.48 1.36 1.23 0.25
(1.11) (1.15) (1.18) (1.19) (2.08) (2.69)
Income Below Median -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.25)
Sample FULL FULL FULL FULL DISC DISC
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES
Household Controls YES YES YES
City Fixed Effects YES YES
Notes:
4.  In the discontinuity sample, applicants with the top 25%  test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are excluded from the sample.  
5. Standard errors in parentheses.
6.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 7:  Labor Market Outcomes (2SLS)
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable is either employed, income,
log(income), or income below median, as indicated. The reported coefficient is on “went to engineering college," which is instrumented
by "above cutoff for admissions."
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower caste applicants. Panel C & D
disaggregate the lower caste groups by the two main categories (OBC and SC).
3. The individual-levelcontrols are dummies for OBC and SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age, dummies for the type of
secondary school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school or government school), and controls for whether or not the
outcome data comes from the parent or child survey. The household-levelcontrols are household head monthlyincome as of 1996 (in Rs),
dummies for the educational attainment of the household head, a dummyvariable for whether the household head is an engineer, a dummy
for whether or not the household head uses a computer at work, and the number of other children in the household.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Upper Caste Groups
First Stage:
went 0.17 0.18 0.2 0.17
(0.10)* (0.10)* (0.10)** (0.10)*
Second Stage:
Employed 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.17
(0.57) (0.56) (0.51) (0.59)
Income 19961.81 17620.66 10613.9 5282.21
(29927.45) (27248.31) (22225.51) (27996.89)
Log(Income) 3.57 3.35 2.98 3.03
(7.38) (6.83) (5.93) (7.81)
Income Below Median -0.28 -0.24 -0.12 0.11
(0.81) (0.74) (0.63) (0.82)
Panel B: Lower Caste Groups (OBC and SC)
First Stage:
went 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Second Stage:
Employed 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25
(0.18)* (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Income 3571.95 4044.27 4173.91 4101.99
(4180.91) (4076.48) (4055.74) (4075.33)
Log(Income) 3.14 3.08 2.94 2.76
(1.74)* (1.71)* (1.77)* (1.79)
Income Below Median -0.37 -0.36 -0.39 -0.36
(0.19)* (0.19)* (0.19)** (0.19)*
Sample FULL FULL FULL FULL
Individual Controls YES YES YES
Household Controls YES YES
City Fixed Effects YES
Quadratic Control in Score YES YES YES YES
Notes:
4. Standard errors in parentheses.
5.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Table 8:  Labor Market Estimates, Including Quadratic Control for Score
1.  In each panel, the first row presents the results of seperate OLS regrssions in which the dependent 
variable is "went to engineering college."  The coefficient presented is on "above cutoff for admission."   In 
the rest of the panel, the cells contains the result of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable 
is either employed, income, log(income), or income below median, as indicated.  The reported coefficient is 
on “went to engineering college," which is instrumented by "above cutoff for admissions."
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower caste
applicants.
3. See Table 7 for a discussion of individual and household controls. All regressions also include a
quadratic control for test score.(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Upper Caste Groups
Went 6929.28 4890.88 12102.3
(5466.10) (5344.92) (90330.97)
Below Median -8035.22 -8102.64
(3295.76)** (4316.32)*




Predicted Score *Went -228.38
(176.27)
Panel B: Lower Caste Groups (OBC and SC)
Went 9426.9 9581.81 -14981.55
(2188.89)*** (2146.69)*** (10621.25)
Below Median 639.59 3835.14
(1878.64) (2337.27)




Predicted Score *Went 65.72
(34.44)*
Sample FULL FULL FULL
Controls YES
Notes:
3. Standard errors in parentheses.
4. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1%
level by ***.
Table 9:   Labor Market Outcomes and Socio-Economic Background
1. Each column in a panel presents the results of a separate IV regression in which the
dependent variable is income. "Predicted Score" is the predicted score from an regression
where the dependent variable is an individual's test score and the regressors are the
individual and household controls. The individual-level controls are dummies for OBC and
SC categories, a gender dummy, the logarithm of age, dummies for the type of secondary
school attended (e.g. English private school, Hindi private school or government school),
and controls for whether or not the outcome data comes from the parent or child survey. The
household-level controls are household head monthly income as of 1996 (in Rs), dummies
for the educational attainment of the household head, a dummy variable for whether the
household head is an engineer, a dummy for whether or not the household head uses a
computer at work, and the number of other children in the household. "Below Median" is a
dummy variable which indicates whether an individual was below the predicted median
score for his or her caste group.
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B
includes lower caste applicants.Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Works as Engineer 0.44 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.3 0.37
(0.12)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (0.25) (0.26)
Uses Computer in Job 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.25 0.68 0.4
(0.14)** (0.12)** (0.12)*** (0.13)** (0.34)** (0.28)
Uses English in Job 0.5 0.47 0.47 0.38 0.78 0.6
(0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)** (0.38)** (0.39)
0.76 0.82 0.99 1.08 0.99 1.19
(0.64) (0.62) (0.63) (0.69) (1.36) (1.52)
Works in Private Sector 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.27 0.34 0.28
(0.12)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)** (0.25) (0.23)
Works in Government Sector -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.11 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14)
Self-Employed/Family-Employed -0.11 -0.1 -0.1 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.08) (0.08)*
Panel B: Lower Caste Groups (OBC and SC)
Works as Engineer 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.22
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.13)** (0.13)*
Uses Computer in Job 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1 0
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14)
Uses English in Job 0.24 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.06 -0.05
(0.08)*** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.13) (0.15)
0.23 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.14 -0.01
(0.09)** (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.15) (0.16)
Works in Private Sector 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
Works in Government Sector 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Self-Employed/Family-Employed -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.1 -0.12
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.06) (0.07)*
Sample FULL FULL FULL FULL DISC DISC
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES
Household Controls YES YES YES
City Fixed Effects YES YES
Notes:
5. Standard errors in parentheses.
6.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable is as indicated. The reported
coefficient is on “went to engineering college," which is instrumented by "above cutoff for admissions."
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower caste applicants. 
3. See Table 7 for a discussion of the included control variables.
4.  In the discontinuity sample, applicants with the top 25%  test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are excluded from the sample.  
Panel A: Upper Caste Groups
Table 10:  Job Characteristics (2SLS)
Strongly Agrees--Views Job as 
Successful
Strongly Agrees--Views Job as 
SuccessfulModel 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Upper Caste Groups
Family or Friends Helped Find Job -0.2 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.55 -0.41
(0.07)*** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.19)*** (0.16)**
Index of Caste Identity -0.21 -0.15 -0.05 0.06 -0.65 0.11
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.56) (0.59)
Reservation Index -0.04 -0.17 -0.29 0.05 -0.11 -0.11
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.79) (1.04)
-0.05 -0.09 -0.15 0.02 0.04 -0.05
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.32) (0.43)
-0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.1 -0.37 -0.23
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.35) (0.49)
0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.35
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.33) (0.55)
Participates in Government -0.2 -0.19 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.24
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.28) (0.33)
Panel B: Lower Caste Groups (OBC and SC)
Family or Friends Helped Find Job -0.01 0 0 0 -0.05 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Index of Caste Identity -0.22 -0.19 -0.24 -0.26 -0.44 -0.43
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.28) (0.32)
Reservation Index 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.84 0.99
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.40)** (0.46)**
0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.37 0.49
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18)** (0.21)**
0.2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.39 0.29
(0.11)* (0.11)* (0.11)* (0.11)* (0.19)** (0.20)
-0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.24 0.35
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.21)*
Participates in Government -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.1
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
Sample FULL FULL FULL FULL DISC DISC
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES
Household Controls YES YES YES
City Fixed Effects YES YES
Notes:
5. Standard errors in parentheses.
6.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate IV regression in which the dependent variable is as indicated. The reported
coefficient is on “went to engineering college," which is instrumented by "above cutoff for admissions."
2. In Panel A, the sample includes upper caste applicants, while the sample in Panel B includes lower caste applicants. 
3. See Table 7 for a discussion of the included control variables.
4.  In the discontinuity sample, applicants with the top 25%  test scores and the bottom 25% test scores are excluded from the sample.  
Table 11:  Social Networks and Beliefs
Agrees with Reservations for Females in 
Government
Agrees with Reservations for Females in 
Engineering Universities
Reservations for Minorities in 
Engineering Universities Fair
Agrees with Reservations for Females in 
Government
Agrees with Reservations for Females in 
Engineering Universities
Reservations for Minorities in 
Engineering Universities FairAbove Below Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Upper Castes 0.380 0.334 0.046
(0.033)
Other Backward Castes 0.329 0.375 -0.046
(0.039)
Scheduled Castes 0.375 0.367 0.008
(0.042)
Upper Castes 4.677 -1.973 6.65
(10.906)
Other Backward Castes -0.733 5.998 -6.731
(11.372)
Scheduled Castes -1.030 -6.177 5.146
(7.877)
Upper Castes 0.037 0.068 -0.03
(0.054)
Other Backward Castes -0.042 0.005 -0.047
(0.055)
Scheduled Castes 0.006 -0.021 0.027
(0.064)
Upper Castes 0.043 0.007 0.036
(0.174)
Other Backward Castes -0.614 -0.020 -0.593
(0.878)
Scheduled Castes 0.018 0.246 -0.228
(0.320)
Upper Castes 0.072 0.013 0.059
(0.058)
Other Backward Castes 0.039 0.027 0.013
(0.051)
Scheduled Castes -0.012 0.000 -0.012
(0.062)
Notes:
3.  Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
1. In Panel A, we report the percentage of individuals found above (Column 1) and below (Column
2) the cutoff for each caste group. The difference in these means is reported in Column 3. The
standard error is presented below the difference in parentheses.
2. In Panel B - E, we report the difference in means of pre-characteristics for those found and not
found during the surveying. We report this difference for those above the cutoff in Column 1 and for
those below the cutoff in Column 2. The difference in these means is reported in Column 3. The
standard error is presented below the difference in parentheses.
B.  Difference In Total Score (Found - Not Found)
E.  Difference in Attended (Found - Not Found)
Appendix Table 1:  Differences in Initial Characteristics Between Individuals Who 
Were Located and Not Located, by Caste Group and Cutoff
A.  Percent Found
C.  Difference in Percent Female (Found - Not Found)



















Applicant Income < Median 0.8
(0.04)***
Notes:
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Significance at 10% level is represented by a *, at the 5% level by a ** and at the 1% level by ***.
Answered By Parent
Appendix Table 2: Correlations Between Parent and Applicant Outcomes
1. Each coefficient contains the result of a separate OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the
variable indicated as asnswered by the Applicant. The reported coefficient is on the same variable as
reported by the parent.